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COMMENTS
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL AND THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
INTRODUCTION
It is undoubtedly true that in a typical job interview a prospective
employee is little concerned with the possibility of an abusive or
capricious discharge by his employer.1 The interview will be con-
spicuously cordial, centering on such topics as salary, job classification,
benefits, the employer's expectations as to performance, and other re-
lated matters. Of course, whether the interviewer mentions it or not,
the employer's right to discharge his employee, absent a specific term
to the contrary, is an assumed provision of the employment contract.
We all take the chance that our choice of employment will withstand
constantly changing economic conditions-that business decisions,
market demands, or technological developments will not claim our
own job.2 We may rage at cruel fate when told that we have been
replaced by a machine, but we perforce withdraw. When discharged
for an abusive, unreasonable, or arbitrary reason, however, an em-
ployee may be expected to react in a far less stoic manner. The dis-
charged party suddenly becomes very interested in his rights under
the employment "contract." His loss may be substantial. He may
have devoted many years of his life to his job, he may lose retirement
benefits, and may have very likely incurred indebtedness and family
responsibility. A discharge, for whatever cause, often impairs his
ability to secure another job.3 When challenged, the employer need
only refer to his implied power to "terminate at will," and need not
1. A recent news article notes the emergence of what may be a contrary trend,
at least in the upper and middle management levels of larger companies. One employment
consultant noted that "one in three individuals requests and gets some type of termi-
nation allowance now; five years ago, it was one in ten." Ricklefs, More Executives Ask
-and Get-Pay Pledges Should They Be Fired, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 11, 1972, at
1, col. 6.
2. See generally R. ARONSON, JOBS, WAGES, AND CHANGING TECHNOLOGY: RE-
CENT EXPERIENCE (1965).
3. See H. VOLLMER, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
143 (1960).
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establish any other defense.4 This Comment will examine the abu-
sively discharged employee's rights under the employment contract
where the contract is terminable at will by either party.
I. THE BASIS OF THE COMMON LAW RIGHT TO DISCHARGE
The employment relationship-which is characterized for legal
purposes as "at will"-is the result of the development of the law of
master and servant, and the common law of contracts.5 The words
"master" and "employer," and "servant" and "employee" are in most
cases synonymous. 6
The relation of master and servant exists, where the master retains
or exercises the power of control in directing, not merely the end
sought to be accomplished, but as well the means and details of its
accomplishment; not only what shall be done, but how it shall be
done.
7
The doctrine of "master and servant" was not originally con-
cerned with notions of contract, but developed from status or tenure
4. The employee, however, is not likely to feel satisfied with such cavalier treat-
ment of the termination.
[A]ll employees expect management recognition of certain rights by virtue
of their common participation in the employee role. They feel that they entered
into the role in good faith, with intent to fulfill the requirements of their jobs
in the best way possible. Their feeling is that the burden of proof is upon
him who claims that anyone has failed to perform his job as required ...
Rules are . . . seen as having their basis in expectations regarding fair and
consistent practice, rather than in the arbitrary will of management.
Id.
5.
The basis of our contract law is the common law, not statute, and the essentials
of the law of master and servant are thus founded on the common law, for
in spite of many statutes regulating the relation of master and servant, the
creation and termination of that relation depends upon the free agreement of
the parties, and the expectancy enforceability of agreements is in the main a
matter of common law and not of statutory regulations.
F. BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 27 (1967).
6. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 383 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964). The common law has for centuries referred to this relationship as "master
and servant," although modem usage has developed the more egalitarian terms of
"employer and employee." See G. FRmDMAN, THE MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT 30-32
(1963).
7. Shannon v. Western Indem. Co., 257 S.W. 522, 523 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1924). The term "employee" was seen as including "all those in the service of another
whether engaged in the performance of manual labor, or in positons of management
and trust, and whether being paid wages or a salary, so long as they remained under
the ultimate control of the employer." Id.
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in land.8 The early phases of the law were influenced by the nature
of the servant's association with the feudal lord, and also by the series
of Statutes of Laborers which treated the relationship of master and
servant as entirely one of status. It was not until the Statutes were
abandoned 0 that contractual doctrines finally prevailed." Nearly a
century has elasped since then, but the rules governing the employ-
ment relationship are little changed.'
2
As in other consensual agreements, a contract,13 written or oral,'
4
express or implied, 5 is necessary to establish the employment relation-
ship. No one fact is conclusive of the existence of such agreement;
rather, it must be determined from all the surrounding circumstances.'"
When interpreting these contracts the courts often rely on the
principle of freedom of contract-"that men should have the greatest
8. F. BATT, supra note 5, at 26. See also Harrison, Termination of Employment,
10 ALBERTA L. REv. 250, 251 (1972).
9. 5 Eliz., c. 4 (1562).
10. They were finally repealed in 1875 by the Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act (Imp) 38 and 39 Vict., c. 86, § 17.
11. The Statutes' influence, however, still obtains in the common law notions of
termination by notice and dismissal for cause. Cf. 1 E. LIpsoN, THE EcoNomiO HISTORY
OF ENGLAND 114 (12th ed. 1959).
12. One writer has opined that these rules may be "the most conservative of the
common law rules protecting freedom of enterprise . . . ." Blumrosen, Workers' Rights
Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis-A Judge for Our Season, 24 RUTGERS
L. REv. 480, 481 (1970).
13. See Holland v. Celebrezze, 223 F. Supp. 347, 350 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); Thurs-
ton v. Hobby, 133 F. Supp. 205, 210 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
14. See Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305, 313-14 (Iowa 1971);
Rubin v. Dairymen's League Co-Op Ass'n, 284 N.Y. 32, 29 N.E.2d 458, aff'g 259 App.
Div. 23, 18 N.Y.S.2d 466, rehearing denied, 284 N.Y. 816, 31 N.E.2d 927 (1940);
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960); cf.
Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App. 109, 32 N.E. 802 (1892);
It has ...been frequently decided that where a contract is personal in
its character, as a contract for personal services, which might terminate with
the death of the party making it, though the contract be for an indefinite
period or a term of years, it is not within the statute of frauds.
Id. at 118, 32 N.E. at 805. But see Ruinello v. Murray, 36 Cal. 2d 687, 227 P.2d 251
(1951) (oral contract of employment for definite term is employment at will because
of the Statute of Frauds).
15. See Wilkins v. City of St. Louis, 404 S.W.2d 783, 788 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966);
American Ins. Group v. McCowin, 7 Ohio App. 2d 62, 64, 218 N.E.2d 746, 749 (1966);
Delzell v. Pope, 200 Tenn. 641, 294 S.W.2d 690 (1956).
16.
In its common law and usually accepted sense, such relationship is tested by
(a) the contractual relationship of the parties; (b) direction and control;
(c) compensation to be paid therefor; and (d) services rendered. When those
matters are considered along with surrounding circumstances, the bona fides
of a contract is a mixed question of law and fact.
Thurston v. Hobby, 133 F. Supp. 205, 210 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
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possible liberty to make such contracts as they please. 1 7 Strict adher-
ence to this principle implies a belief that the bargaining need not be
equal, nor the exchange finally agreed upon be fair. Judges are often
unwilling to remake the employment contract, reasoning that if the
parties wished to assure employment security for the employee, it
would have been provided for in their agreement.' At the beginning
of this century the Texas Supreme Court invalidated a state law which
would have required an employer to show cause why an employee
was fired. Barely able to restrain its incredulity, the court stated:
The requirement that the corporation give to the discharged
employee, on his demand, a statement of the "true cause" for his
discharge, necessarily implies that there must have been a cause to
justify the dismissal, else, how could the "true cause" be given?
The value of the contract to each party consisted largely in the
mutual right to dissolve the relation of master and servant at will.
The destruction of that right in the corporation was a violation of
the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of
the United States.19
The court realized that an employer may act out of "whim", but
identified that as an element of his right to terminate.20
As in contracts generally, both parties must assent to its terms.
In the employment interview2' many terms are expressly detailed,
17. M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 962 (2d Cir.
1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
18. Cf. Morlee Sales Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 9 N.Y.2d 16, 172 N.E.2d
280, 210 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1961).
19. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Griffin, 106 Tex. 477, 171 S.W. 703 (1914).
20. Id. at 480, 171 S.W. at 706. Many decisions have regarded employment at
will as a means of keeping the employee free from any encumbrances which would
impair his chances of improving himself. See, e.g., cases cited note 27 infra & accom-
panying text.
An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently, thereby
cutting himself off from all chances of improving his condition; indeed, in
this land of opportunity it would be against public policy and the spirit of
our institutions that any man should thus handicap himself ....
Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174 La. 66, 67, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932).
Thus, a prime cause of employment insecurity, and the justification for capricious and
arbitrary conduct by employers, is placed upon the shoulders of the employee. It is
for his own benefit, we are told, that employers exert such inordinate power over the
employee's life. See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 1404, 1419 (1967).
21. The interview in the employment situation is more than just analogous to
negotiations in other forms of contracts-it is a negotiation wherein the parties set the
terms of the contract, albeit in a ritualized and symbolic way. Negotiation is "that
which pass[es] between parties or their agents in the course of or incident to the making
of a contract." BLACK'S LAW DICTrIONARY 1188 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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but much is left unsaid. To an employee subjected to an abusive
termination the most important of these may well be the duration of
the employment. While the employee may have contemplated working
until retirement, the employer, in the usual case, contemplates the
relationship to last only as long as the employee is needed-a period
of uncertain duration. If a definite time has been expressly agreed
upon,22 the employer will be subject to suit for wrongful discharge.
Where no express time period is shown, however, the employee must
be able to demonstrate either that a term of service is implied, that
the employment is permanent,23 or for life,24 or that a definite dura-
tion has arisen from business usage or custom. 25 Failing this, the
employment relationship will be terminable at will, leaving the em-
ployee without a remedy despite the inequitable, or even outrageous,
circumstances which may surround the dismissal.2 6 The discharged
employee's task is clear: he must demonstrate to the court's satisfaction
that there is a definite term to the contract. However, one need not
survey the reported cases assiduously to see that such a task is for-
midable. Although not conclusive, there is a strong presumption that
employment contracts are terminable at will unless the terms of the
contract or other circumstances clearly manifest the parties' intent
to the contrary.
The presumption is grounded on a policy that it would otherwise
be unreasonable for a man to bind himself permanently to a posi-
tion, thus eliminating the possibility of later improving that posi-
tion.
27
This presumption has resulted from social and economic factors said
to be endemic to this country,28 and has given rise to the so-called
"American rule," formulated nearly a century ago:
In England it is held that a general hiring, or a hiring by the terms
of which no time is fixed, is a hiring by the year.... With us, the
22. See Brekken v. Reader's Digest Special Prods., Inc., 353 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.
1965).
23. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169
(1972).
24. Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1971).
25. Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971).
26. See, e.g., Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959); Odum v.
Bush, 125 Ga. 184,53 S.E. 1013 (1906).
27. Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 393, 153 N.W.2d 587, 590
(1967). See Peacock v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 221 Ala. 680, 130 So. 411 (1930).
28. See H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 136 (2d ed. 1886).
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rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is, prima facie,
a hiring at will; and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring
the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much
a day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite
hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but
only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.29
The rule was incorporated into the common law in Martin v.
New York Life Insurance Co.,30 and has been generally followed to
the present. It is not surprising, then, that so many of the cases have
been fought over the presence or absence of a definite term of service.
II. THE DURATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
A. Contracts for a Definite Term
Whether the contract of employment contains a provision for a
definite term of service depends upon a number of factors which are,
unfortunately, inconsistently and ambiguously applied by the courts.
This serves to intensify the confusion and frustration that attend many
employment terminations. The following cases illustrate the difficulty
of ascertaining a definite term of service in an employment contract.
Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co.31 involved a suit by an attorney who
agreed to work for the defendant company at the rate of $20,000 per
year. Upon release, he argued that since the terms of his contract
specified that it was for a definite period, a hiring for an annual salary
created a contract for one year. However, the court disagreed and held
that the nature of the employment demonstrated that no fixed period
of time was intended. The contract could, therefore, be terminated
at the will of either party. 2 A hiring at a monthly or yearly salary,
if no duration is specified in the contract, is presumed to be at will,
and either party may terminate without liability.
3 3
Many courts have failed to find a durational provision, even where
a job is described in terms of a definite period of time. Hanna v.
R.C.A. Service Co.34 demonstrates how meaningless inducement may
29. Id.
30. 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416, 26 N.Y.S. 283 (1895).
31. 22 I1. App. 2d 369, 161 N.E.2d 355 (1959).
32. Id. at 371, 161 N.E.2d at 357.
33. Id.
34. 336 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Penn. 1971).
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be. Plaintiff in Hanna responded to an advertisement soliciting elec-
trical engineers for an 18-month assignment in Thule, Greenland.
In the interview he was again told the assignment was to last 18
months, and was offered a salary payable bimonthly. However, he
signed a document which read "I also acknowledge that my employ-
ment is for no fixed period of time and that it may extend indefinitely
if the company and I so agree or it may be terminated by myself or the
company at will." 35 Discharged without cause after three months in
Greenland, plaintiff instituted an action for breach of the oral 18-
month employment contract. The District Court held that plaintiff
was hired for an indefinite period of time, and in the absence of a
contract or a statute, employment is at will and may be terminated
at any time by either party without cause.36
A similar rationale was used in Bucian v. J. L. Jacobs & Co., 37
but a thoughtful dissenting opinion provides a refreshing alterna-
tive to this rigid application of contract principles. Plaintiff began
employment with defendant company as an agent in Saudi Arabia,
at $1250 per month. A document indicated that the employment was
"scheduled ... for a period of eighteen months." 38 One month later
employment was terminated, allegedly because his work was unsatis-
factory, and the sole question litigated was whether the employment
was for a definite duration or terminable at will. The plaintiff relied
on the 18-month duration of the assignment and defendant's tax
statement of his wages, which acknowledged an exclusion for con-
tinuous employment outside the United States for 17 of 18 consecu-
tive months. The court found these arguments insufficient to convert
an employment relationship terminable at will into a contract of
specific duration.3 9
The dissent concluded that plaintiff should have been granted
a trial to determine whether the defendants had made a reasonable
determination that his work was unsatisfactory. Although the em-
ployee was free to terminate at will, the personal and family disrup-
tion necessarily involved in the move to a distant country was suffi-
cient to prevent the contract from being illusory. Enforcement of de-
fendant's promise to continue the employment for the full 18 months,
35. Id. at 64.
36. Id.
37. 428F.2d531 (7thCir. 1970).
38. Id. at 532.
39. Id. at 533-34.
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subject to termination for cause, should have been granted.40 This
dissent is a rare instance of judicial notice of external factors which
might have converted an obvious employment-at-will contract into
one of definite duration. Such a finding, however, is against the over-
whelming weight of authority.41
The contracts in Atwood, Hanna and Bucian express their dura-
tion in terms of a rate of pay. In addition, all three contracts abound
with extrinsic facts which tend to demonstrate the intent of both par-
ties to form a contract. The decisions reached in these cases are not,
however, atyptical. Without a provision expressly detailing the dura-
tion of an employment contract, the presumption is that it may be
terminated at the will of either party.
B. Contracts for Permanent Employment
A distinct problem arises when an employee claims that he is
entitled to "permanent" employment (or for as long as a certain set
of facts exists), "lifetime" employment, or employment for an ex-
tended period of time. Very often these forms of employment appear
to bind the employer for the employee's life, while leaving the em-
ployee free to terminate at will.42 As in other contractual situations,
such a term may affect the existence of a valid contract, raising ques-
tions of mutuality of obligation and sufficiency of consideration 43 -
two concepts which are often confused and inconsistently applied. 44
The concept of mutuality of obligation is used to express the
notion that each party has made a promise and each has incurred an
obligation.45 The rule is often stated that, when the contract is based
40. Id. at 534 (dissenting opinion).
41. See, e.g., Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp., 46 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1931);
Peacock v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 221 Ala. 680, 130 So. 411 (1930); Great At!.
& Pac. Tea Co. v. Summers, 25 Ala. App. 404, 148 So. 332 (1933); Wolfe v. Stark
Bros. Nurseries & Orchards Co., 288 S.W. 1004 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926).
42. See, e.g., Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214
N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961); Dallas County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Ingram,
395 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
43. See IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152, at 13 (1963).
44. Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1924):
The terms "consideration" and "mutuality of obligation" are sometimes con-
fused. "Consideration is essential; mutuality of obligation is not unless the
want of mutuality would leave one party without a valid or available
consideration for his promise .... "
Id. at 688 (cite omitted). See also Jackson v. Pepper Gasoline Co., 280 Ky. 226, 133
S.W.2d 91, 93 (1939).
45. 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152, at4 (1963).
218
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solely on the mutual promise of the parties, either both parties are
bound, or the contract lacks mutuality and neither is bound.46 When
an employee is free to terminate at will and the employer is not,
the contract would be void for want of mutuality. However, the re-
quirement of mutuality of obligation is subject to numerous excep-
tions47 and has led to conflicting results. Modern decisions rarely hold
that lack of mutuality alone is sufficient to destroy an employment
contract. 48 Indeed, many modern authorities have urged the abandon-
ment of the term, 49 and by implication, the notion that both parties
must somehow be "bound."50
Mutuality of obligation has been ascribed various roles in the
law of contracts. It is sometimes used to denote the presence or ab-
sence of consideration; 51 conversely, it is often said to be inessential
to the formation of a contract.52 But despite this ambiguity, it is obvi-
ous that in the employment situation, the real problem is lack of
consideration, and injustice may result when a court merely finds
no enforceable return promise. The issue that should be considered
is whether the extent of the employee's sacrifice is sufficient to bind
the employer to the contract.
46. See, e.g., Storm v. United States, 94 U.S. 76 (1876); Rich v. Doneghey, 1
Okla. 204, 177 P. 86 (1918); Riser v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 169 Va. 574,
194 S.E. 727 (1938).
47. For example, "unilateral" contracts, once widely believed to be void for want
of mutuality, are today generally recognized as valid when the promise supplies some
form of consideration. See, e.g., Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App.
2d 98, 291 P.2d 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Delaware Trust Co. v. Delaware Trust Co.,
43 Del. Ch. 186, 222 A.2d 320 (1966); Ireland v. Charlesworth, 98 N.W.2d 224 (N.D.
1959); Scott v. J.F. Duthie & Co., 125 Wash. 470, 216 P. 853 (1923): "The principle
of mutuality of obligation, as generally applied in the law of contracts, has no place in
the consideration of unilateral contracts." Id. at 471, 216 P. at 853. But see Pfeffer v.
Ernst, 82 A.2d 763 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951).
48. But see Hope v. National Airlines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1957); Drake v. Block, 247 Iowa 517, 74 N.W.2d 577 (1956).
49. See IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152 (1963); G. GRiSmORE, LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 68, at 116 (rev. ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81 (1969).
50. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 67, at 131 (1970).
51. Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co., 247 Miss. 157, 154 So. 2d 151 (1963).
"Mutuality is a legal term of elusive meaning, but as it relates to the validity of con-
tracts in California, lack of mutuality means only lack of consideration." J.C. Millett
Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484, 493 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
52. See Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1924); Armstrong
Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102, 133 N.E. 711 (1921);
Hanson v. Central Show Printing Co., 256 Iowa 1221, 130 N.W.2d 654 (1964). "If
the lack of mutuality amounts to a lack of consideration, then the contract is invalid
... . Though consideration is essential to the validity of a contract, it is not essential
that such consideration consist of a mutual promise." Standard Oil Co. v. Veland, 207
Iowa 1340, 1343, 224 N.W. 467, 469 (1929).
219
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Hablas v. Armour & Co. 53 demonstrates the destructive effect of
strict adherence to a mutuality requirement in employment contracts.
There, plaintiff was fired one year before retirement, after 45 years
of service with the defendant, for allegedly engaging in conduct "un-
becoming an Armour management employee." He lost all rights in
the company pension fund (except the right to the return of his con-
tributions), and brought suit for damages resulting from the dis-
charge. A jury found plaintiff free of misconduct sufficient to warrant
dismissal but its verdict was subsequently vacated by the trial court.
Plaintiff had been a valued employee who on several occasions
had sought more remunerative employment with other companies,
but each time had been dissuaded by the defendant. He was often told
of his worth to the company, and reminded of the retirement bene-
fits he would lose. One of defendant's managers had told him, "Well,
I think you are crazy. You simply can't afford to pass up all the pen-
sion rights you have coming for the sake of [increased salary with a
competitor]. '54 Plaintiff argued that he had been induced to continue
in defendant's employ by implications that he would be retained until
retirement, and reliance on such promises made his discharge wrong-
ful. 55
Plaintiff became a participant in the pension plan in 1911, at
which time he signed the following agreement:
I . . .understand that the employment obtained under this applica-
tion may be terminated at the pleasure of either employer or em-
ployee without previous notice. 0
On appeal, the Hablas court noted simply that the plaintiff-employee
was at all times free to terminate his employment at will; "[t]his being
true, the purported employment contract is void for want of mutual-
ity of obligation." 57 Therefore, defendant had an "absolute right to
discharge the plaintiff with or without cause .... ,,"8 Despite the
apparent hardship involved, the court blamed the contract itself
as one which did not afford protection to the plaintiff. Lacking mu-
tuality, there must be a valid consideration, and the court could not,
53. 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959).
54. Id. at 76.
55. Id. at 75.
56. Id. at 73.
57. Id. at 78.
58. Id. at 74 n.2.
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under the circumstances of this case, find any consideration supplied
by the plaintiff to bind his employment until retirement. The docu-
ment signed by the plaintiff 44 years earlier, acknowledging his em-
ployment to be at will, did not permit the court to remake the con-
tract for the parties. The durability of this ancient document defies
understanding. To the court, it had maintained its vitality despite
the obvious change in the nature of the employment, the expecta-
tions of the parties, and the very basis of the understanding by which
the employment endured.5 9
A contrary result was reached in Chinn v. China National Avia-
tion Corp.60 Plaintiff, an airline pilot, notified his empolyer of his
intention to resign. He was then informed of new severance benefits
which were attractive enough to induce him to remain with the air-
line for another month and a half, at which time he was fired. Plain-
tiff sought a proportionate share of the termination benefit, but de-
fendants argued that since plaintiff gave no consideration, their offer
was merely a gratuity. The court held, however, that the employer's
regulations, providing employment benefits upon severance and
termination, constituted an offer of a unilateral contract. This offer
was accepted when the employee remained because of the lure of the
additional benefits. The consideration was the employee's continuing
to work and his foregoing other opportunities. The court found suffi-
cient consideration even though there was no mutuality of obliga-
tion and held that a valid unilateral contract had been formed.61
These cases demonstrate the need to look beyond the doctrine
of mutuality of obligation for the validity of employment contracts.
The determining factor in such contracts is the presence or absence
of consideration given by the employee to make the employer's prom-
ise legally enforceable. What constitutes sufficient consideration, how-
ever, is an open question and the subject of much litigation.
C. The Problem of Sufficient Consideration
The general rule has emerged that, absent any consideration be-
yond the employee's promise to perform, a contract for permanent or
59. Id. at 78-79.
60. 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
61. See also Lloyd v. American Can Co., 128 Wash. 298, 222 P. 876 (1924).
"Any contract containing a consideration is enforceable, whether it is otherwise mutual
or not." Id. at 301, 222 P. at 879.
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lifetime employment is construed to be for an indefinite period
terminable at will by either party.62 Even where an employee has
given additional consideration in connection with a contract for
permanent employment, a question arises as to what the parties in-
tended by the term "permanent employment."
There might be several possible durations for a contract of perma-
nent employment. Among those could be employment for a reason-
able period; employment for life; for as long as the employee was
able to perform the services (his work life); for as long as the em-
ployee's services were satisfactory; for as long as employment was
available in the business with which the employment was con-
nected.6
3
Clearly such contracts abound in ambiguities that are not readily
reconciled. Courts are generally reluctant to view a contract as creat-
ing permanent or lifetime employment. The weight of authority appears
to be that where purported long-term contracts are called into ques-
tion, they will not be sustained unless such an intention of the parties
is clearly and expressly stated.64 There is a presumption that the par-
ties, though speaking in terms of permanent employment, have in
mind the ordinary business contract for a continuing employment,
terminable at the will of either.65 The assumption rests on the view
that, in effect, these contracts are quite often unilateral undertakings
by the employer to provide employment for so long as the employee
wishes to work, with allowance for the employee to terminate at
will. Further, as such contracts involve personal services for unusually
long periods, courts are reluctant to render the employer liable to
62. Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889, 902 (N.D. Iowa 1961); Stauter
v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Iowa 1971); Hanson v. Central Show
Printing Co., 256 Iowa 1221, 1223, 130 N.W.2d 654, 657 (1964); Forrer v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 393, 153 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1967).
63. Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889, 902 (N.D. Iowa 1961). District
judge Graven suggested in Bixby that where the term "permanent employment" is present,
for the sake of clarity and administrative efficiency, such term should mean that the
parties intended the employment to be continued for a reasonable period. In deter-
mining that period the trier of fact should consider all the surrounding circumstances
"including such circumstances as the probable continuing ability to perform the services
and the probable continuing need of the employer for such services in the business to
which the employment related." Id. at 902-03.
64. Savarese v. Pyrene Mfg. Co., 9 N.J. 595, 89 A.2d 237 (1952); Shiddell v.
Electro Rust-Proofing Corp., 34 N.J. Super. 278, 112 A.2d 290 (1954).
65. Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 400, 153 N.W.2d 587, 589
(1967).
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pay wages into an uncertain business future. 66 The employee who
would claim his right to permanent or lifetime employment has,
therefore, a difficult course to follow; even when faced with unfair re-
sults, the courts have generally held against him.
In the interesting case of Odum v. Bush,67 plaintiff was a highly
skilled coffin maker who had attained the position of superintendent
of a coffin factory in Newberry, South Carolina. He had also acquired,
in his 25 years employment, an unstated number of shares in the
company. Defendants wished to begin a rival factory in Columbus,
Georgia, but they knew nothing of the coffin making business, and
thus needed an expert to assist them. To this end they journeyed to
Newberry, and there solicited plaintiff to go with them to Columbus
and join their venture on the following terms: (1) plaintiff was to be
superintendent of the new factory at a salary of $100 per month but
was to draw reduced wages sufficient only to cover his immediate liv-
ing expenses; (2) he was to be a stockholder in the new company
by investing in it whatever money he could raise from the sale of
his property and stock in his former company; and (3) at the end of the
year he would be able to convert the withheld salary into stock of
the new company. 68
Plaintiff then sold his property and stock, disposed of his resi-
dence, resigned his old position, and journeyed to Columbus. The
defendants relied solely on plaintiff to develop the company. A few
months later, after the company was assured of success, defendants
fired plaintiff without cause. Plaintiff instituted suit for breach of
contract, claiming damages for losses sustained in moving to the new
city, disposing of his property, foregoing the opportunity to secure
other employment, and loss of the large profits which would have
accrued to him had he become a stockholder. It was alleged that his
dismissal without cause was a breach of the contract, thus allowing
recovery of all damages which might flow directly or indirectly there-
from. After reviewing the provisions of the employment contract, the
court stated:
The parties to the contract doubtless entertained the hope and ex-
pectation that it would be to the mutual advantage of all con-
cerned that the plaintiff should continue indefinitely to discharge
66. Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889, 898 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
67. 125 Ga. 184, 53 S.E. 1013 (1906).
68. Id., 53 S.E. at 1014.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the duties of superintendent of the factory, invest his money in the
venture, and co-operate with the defendants in their efforts to make
it a financial success. But the fact remains that the defendants did
not bind themselves to employ the plaintiff, nor did he obligate him-
self to remain in their services for any definite period beyond the first
month of hiring. . . .An executory contract of service for no fixed
period of time is obviously too indefinite to be capable of enforce-
ment: an offer of employment at so much per month will in the ab-
sence of anything further indicating the period of employment, be
treated as meaning employment for a term of one month. 0
The court found the additional considerations supplied by plain.
tiff to be of no effect because the contract was too indefinite to be
capable of enforcement. Though the facts did indicate persuasively
that the parties contemplated an enduring relationship to their mu-
tual benefit, the court could not bring itself to "arbitrarily" assign
a duration to the contract when an express provision to that effect
was lacking3
0
Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,71 demonstrates a further prob-
lem in proving the existence of a contract for an extended period of
employment. Plaintiff was employed by defendant for 18 years but
was forced to resign due to ill health. After he began operating a
farm, he was induced by defendant to return to work as manager of
the hardware department, and was subsequently promised permanent
employment if he would give up his farm. Plaintiff obligingly disposed
of the farm and livestock at a loss, and shortly thereafter was dis-
charged by defendant without cause. Plaintiff brought suit based on
a theory of promissory estoppel,72 abandoning any claim based on
classical contract grounds. The court readily dispensed with the
promissory estoppel argument, but by way of dicta, stated that plain-
tiff could have proven the contract if he had shown the presence of
"additional consideration. ' 73 However, the court found:
[U]nder circumstances where an employee has given consideration
of benefit to the employer, additional to the service of employment,
a contract for permanent employment is valid and enforceable and
not against public policy and continues to operate as long as the
employer remains in business and has work for the employee, and
69. Id. at 189, 53 S.E. at 1015-16.
70. Id.
71. 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
72. See notes 114-29 infra & accompanying text.
73. 36 Wis. 2d at 395, 153 N.W.2d at 591.
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the employee is willing and able to do his work satisfactorily and
does not give cause for his discharge .... We do not deem that the
detriment to the plaintiff herein in giving up his farming opera-
tions at a loss constituted such additional consideration. . . . A
permanent employment contract is terminable at will unless there
is additional consideration in the form of an economic or financial
benefit to the employer. A mere detriment to the employee is not
enough.74
Since the only benefit to the defendant was plaintiff's rendering of
services, the court found that there was no additional consideration.
Allegations of additional consideration have also been rejected
by courts in cases where an employee has given up a job in response
to an offer for permanent employment, 75 where expenses have been
incurred in moving to a new place of employment, 76 where the em-
ployee has rejected other offers, 77 and where the employee has sold or
disposed of property at a loss.78 The rationale behind these cases is
that the employer has received no extra economic or financial bene-
fit, and that it was only natural that the new employee had to incur
expenses, dispose of property, or turn down other opportunities in
order to obtain a new job.79
A contrary result was reached in Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prod-
ucts.80 That court had no problem finding additional consideration
where, as an incident to the employment contract, plaintiffs were
induced to sell their business to defendants.8 ' The court saw this as
additional consideration which would allow enforcement of the con-
tract for permanent employment, as it resulted in a financial benefit
accruing to defendant. The consideration differs from the preceding
two cases only to the extent that the financial benefit is obvious and
immediate. The consideration in Stauter was an existing, profitable
business; in both Odum and Forrer the consideration was only a finan-
cial detriment to the plaintiffs. By obtaining the valuable skills of
74. Id. at 394, 153 N.W.2d at 590 (emphasis added). See also Wright v. C.S.
Graves Land Co., 100 Wis. 269, 75 N.W. 1000 (1898).
75. Edwards v. Kentucky Util. Co., 286 Ky. 341, 150 S.W.2d 916 (1941). Contra,
Riefkin v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 290 F. 286 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
76. Rape v. Mobile & O.R.R., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So. 585 (1924).
77. Meredith v. John Deere Plow Co., 261 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958).
78. Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
79. See, e.g., Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 249 N.Y. 439, 164 N.E.
342 (1928).
80. 188 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1971).
81. Id. at 306-07.
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otherwise reluctant workmen, however, the defendants in Odum and
Forrrer had in fact received an economic benefit which without their
promises would have been unavailable. After receiving the economic
benefit, the defendants discarded their employees and erected the
barriers of "indefiniteness" and "lack of consideration" to defeat the
contract.
A more difficult problem was presented to a California court in
Drezewiecki v. H. & R. Block, Inc.82 A contract of employment was en-
tered into between a corporation operating a tax service and an em-
ployee who was hired to manage the business in virgin territory. The
contract, in addition to providing the employee with a substantial
share of the profits, expressly stipulated that the employment was re-
newable on a year-to-year basis, unless either party gave 90 days writ-
ten notice. The employer was to give such notice "only in case [the
employee] improperly conducted the business. '83 When defendant's
business proved more successful than anticipated, it attempted to
modify the profit-sharing agreement, but plaintiff refused and his
employment was terminated. At trial, the court, with a noteworthy
simplicity in its reasoning, found that the contract was enforceable
and could not be terminated by defendant except for cause. A sub-
stantial verdict was returned for plaintiff. On appeal, defendant ar-
gued that the contract was in actuality a contract of permanent em-
ployment, and that because there was no evidence to show that it was
based upon some consideration other than the services to be ren-
dered, it was terminable at the will of either party.84
The appellate court reasoned, however, that merely repeating
the above rule and applying it to a set of facts would "confuse form
with substance," and would almost always result in finding a contract
terminable at the will of the employer.88 The erroneous application
of this theory would lead to the conclusion that double consideration
was necessary (i.e., the employee's services to maintain the employment
at will, and some further consideration to maintain the employment
for any extended period of time) in the absence of which no contract
could be shown. Quoting Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper,811 the
court emphasized that
82. 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1972).
83. Id. at 700, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
84. Id. at 701, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
85. Id. at 702, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
86. 120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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[i]f it is their purpose, the parties may enter into a contract for
permanent employment-not terminable except pursuant to its ex-
press terms-by stating clearly their intention to do so, even though
no other consideration than services to be performed is expected
by the employer or promised by the employee.
8 7
Absent the express term, the general rule concerning permanent em-
ployment could be invoked. Such reasoning recognized that this situa-
tion did not, in effect, call for permanent employment, but rather
"employment for only as long as, certain [sic] state of facts exists, i.e.,
that the employee properly conducts the business."8 Although there
is no mutuality of obligation, nor additional consideration, an express
provision to terminate only in good faith converted this otherwise
at-will contract into one that substantially protected the employee
from arbitrary or capricious discharge. The decision avoided the un-
fortunate term "permanent," and instead redefined the durational
expectations of the parties. The court rejected any mechanical applica-
tion of contract "rules," such as the requirement of additional con-
sideration, which would have produced a result contrary to the parties'
manifest intent.
The preceeding sections demonstrate that a worker whose em-
ployment is characterized as "at will" is afforded little or no pro-
tection from abusive discharges by his employer. To establish his
employment as something other than at will, however, poses a formida-
ble task to the discharged employee. He must be able to prove that
his contract, either expressly or impliedly, has a definite duration. In
situations where the employment relationship was contemplated by
the employee to last for a lifetime, permanently, or for an otherwise
extended duration, he must show that he has supplied an additional
consideration to bind the employer for such time, or that an express
provision clearly shows the parties' intention to make the employment
relationship endure for such time. Failing this, the contract is termina-
ble at will by the employer, with or without cause, and no right of
action for a wrongful discharge will lie despite the nature of the dis-
missal. Where there is no definite term of employment, and where
87. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 702-03, 101 Cal. Rptr.
171, 173 (1972).
88. Id. at 702, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
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the employee is not covered by any relevant statute, he is defenseless
against arbitrary or abusive discharge.89
III. METHODS OF LIMITING THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO DISCHARGE
A. Requirement of Good Faith Discharges
Perhaps the most substantial right to be won by demonstrating
that the employment is not at the will of the employer is the right to
be discharged only for good cause. A New York court outlined the
requirement in Carter v. Brodlee,90 a depression era case where plain-
tiff was discharged from a two-year contract, renewed under various
circumstances for over 30 years, because he would not take a substan-
tial reduction in pay. The contract contained a provision which bound
the employee, while allowing the employer to terminate at will:
This agreement is made for two years from November 1st, 1925, but
it is understood and agreed that we retain the right to terminate the
agreement and to discharge you at anytime, should we feel called
upon to do so for any reason. 91
The trial court believed that this provision did, in fact, allow the em-
ployer to dismiss at any time. On appeal, a contrary result was reached:
Such a construction would make the contract merely one at
defendants' will, though by its terms it was for two years. A construc-
tion will not be given to a contract, if possible, that would place one
of the parties at the mercy of the other .... Under the clause in
question, we are of opinion that any discharge before the expiration
89.
[I]t is evident that neither the common law nor statutory law, nor [employer]
practices thereunder afford employees any protection from the arbitrary and
capricious exercise by the employer of his power to discharge, lay off, demote
or transfer, change their jobs, rates of pay, or any other term or condition
of employment for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all, and without
notice to or consultation with anyone, so long as there is no discrimination
because of union activities, race, color, sex, or age.
Lecture by Ruth Weyand, Twenty-second Annual Conference on Labor, June 10, 1969,
in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE
ON LABOR 185-86 (T. Christensen ed. 1970).
In 1968, only 23 percent of the labor force were union members. The majority of
the employees in the United States have little in the way of legal protection of their
jobs. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1971 HANDBOOK OF
LABOR STATISTICS, table 143, at 307.
90. 245 App. Div. 49, 280 N.Y.S. 368 (Ist Dep't 1935).
91. Id. at 50, 280 N.Y.S. at 370.
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[date] should have some "reasonable" ground and that the reason
must be attended with good faith.
9 2
The maxim often formulated and generally followed, is that an
employment contract for a stated term may not be terminated by the
employer without a "cause sufficient in law which would justify an
employer in discharging an employee." 93 As might be expected, the
source for much of the litigation in this area is found in the determi-
nation of whether the cause is sufficient. "Good cause" has been de-
fined as a "failure of an employee to perform his duties in the scope
of his employment in such manner as a person of ordinary prudence
in the same employment would have performed under the same or
similar circumstances. ' 94 Such good cause would almost certainly in-
clude inefficiency, 95 dishonesty,96 failure to perform any part of his
duties, 97 and, in certain circumstances, his disability.98 However, re-
fusal to accept a new position has been held not to be good cause.99
In any event, whether the employer has "good cause" to terminate
the employment is a question of fact for the jury.100
A requirement that discharge may be effected only in good faith
clearly acts as a strong deterrent to arbitrary or abusive discharge.
When an employee has a contract of definite duration the employer
either expressly or impliedly promises not to discharge his employee
except for good cause.10 1 The employee, in turn, expressly or im-
pliedly promises to perform satisfactorily.10 2 The employee-at-will
also promises to perform satisfactorily, but receives no return promise
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Vogel v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 234 App. Div. 313, 318, 254 N.Y.S. 881, 886
(2d Dep't 1932); see Parsil v. Emery, 242 App. Div. 653, 272 N.Y.S. 439 (2d Dep't
1934); Ward v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 480 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
94. Ingrain v. Dallas County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 425 S.W.2d
366, 367) Tex. Civ. App. 1968); accord, Mr. Eddie, Inc., v. Ginsberg, 430 S.W.2d 5, 10
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
95. Lowenstein v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 319 F. Supp. 1096 (D.
Mass. 1970).
96. Texas Employment Comm'n v. Ryan, 481 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
97. Clem v. Bowman Lumber Co., 83 N.M. 659, 495 P.2d 1106 (1972).
98. Fisher v. Church of St. Mary, 497 P.2d 882 (Wyo. 1972).
99. Lanier v. Alenco, 459 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1972).
100. Ward v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 480 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972).
101. Dallas County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Ingram, 395 S.W.2d
834, 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
102. See Hooser v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 177 F. Supp. 186, 194 (S.D. Ind. 1959),
aff'd, 279 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1960).
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of release only for good cause and in good faith. The arguments which
serve to sustain this disparity are of questionable force in the labor
market of today.
B. Statutorily Restricting the Right to Discharge
In the United States, the employee-at-will has few statutory pro-
tections for his job.103 The National Labor Relations Act prohibits
dismissal for union organization activities; 04 Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial discrimination in employment. 101
Additional enactments protect the worker from discrimination based
on age,10 and returning veterans are assured their former employ-
ment. 07 The employee-at-will who is fired for a capricious or abusive
reason, however, has no legislative protection.
By comparison, Great Britain, which generally subscribes to the
same common law notions of employment at will as the United
States, was the scene of an attempt to alleviate the harshness of the
termination doctrine through a statutory scheme proffered by the
International Labor Organization:
Termination of employment should not take place unless there is a
valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or
conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of
the undertaking, establishment or service.'08
Though not yet the law in England, there is considerable movement
towards recognizing this type of job protection. 10 9
There has been no equivalent proposal in the United States, nor
has there been any discernible pressure to enact such a measure.
There are, however, contractual relationships analogous to employ-
103. See Lecture, supra note 89 at 174-75.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970).
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-(e)(2) (Supp. 1972).
106. Age Discrimination, in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
107. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 459(c) (1970).
108. INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE 1919-1966, Recommendation No. 119,
§ 2(l), at 1060-63 (1967).
109. See Clayton, A Proprietary Right in Employment, 1967 J. Bus. L. 139:
Recent legislation in the form of the Contracts of Employment Act 1963 and
the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 marks a first hesitant step in giving legal
recognition that an employee has a proprietary interest in his job rather than a
purely contractual interest. These acts "provide statutory regulation of the
so-called freedom of contract in the employer-employee relationship."
Jd.
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ment at will-franchises, distributorships, manufacturer's representa-
tives, and automobile dealerships-which have also experienced the
problem of abusive and capricious terminations. Leaders in these
fields are painfully aware of the legal implications of contractual re-
lations which exist at the will of the parties. In at least one field, auto-
mobile dealerships, legislative enactments have eased the impact of
the termination doctrine.110
Many automobile dealer agreements customarily provided for
termination at will by the manufacturer. Where dealers had ex-
pended considerable time and money in developing their businesses,
termination without cause resulted in great hardships. A few courts
attempted to alleviate the dealers' plight by forbidding termination
for a reasonable time, thereby allowing the dealers to recoup their
expenses."' The dealers found most courts to be unresponsive to their
problems, however, and were eventually forced to seek protection
through various legislative proposals." 2
It is here that the similarity between franchise dealers and dis-
charged employees ends. The dealers are a fairly cohesive group, with
shared goals, professional organizations, and a large lobby." 3 Indi-
vidual employees, on the other hand, are neither likely to band to-
gether to petition a legislature, nor presently capable of wielding
significant political power as a group, notwithstanding their large
numbers. It would not be surprising to find union opposition to any
statutory scheme to restrict termination, as such a measure would
erode'a large part of labor's traditional appeal to unprotected work-
ers. Furthermore, attempts to impose strict statutory schemes may
obtain only at the price of increased rigidity in employment rela-
tions. For these reasons the plight of the abusively dismissed employee
can be better alleviated through judicial solutions.
C. Enforcing Employment Contracts Through Promissory Estoppel,
The emergence of promissory estoppel has provided the couris
with a significant means of enforcing promises which would be un-
110. See Macaulay, Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Cor-
poration and Those Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers, and
the Legal System, 1965 Wis. L. REv. (pts. 1-2) 483, 740.
111. See Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber Engineered Prods., Inc., 237 F.2d 879 (4th
Cir. 1956); Gibbs v. Bardahl Oil Co., 331 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1960).
112.' Automobile Dealers Franchise Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970). See also
Schnolbel v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
113. See generally Macaulay, supra note 110.
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enforceable under traditional contract principles. The doctrine has
been invoked in a variety of situations, but generally its use is trig-
gered when a court is faced with outrageous or unjust results if a
party's promise is not made binding. The emerging willingness of
courts favorably to consider promissory estoppel arguments makes
the doctrine an interesting alternative in causes of action based on
breach of an employment contract where it is necessary to somehow
find adequate consideration to place the employer under an obliga-
tion not to discharge without good cause.
Section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts states the gen-
erally accepted rule of promissory estoppel:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the
part of the promisee and which does induce such action or for-
bearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise.114
Though promissory estoppel1"5 has been identified by several courts
as a "recognized species of consideration,"'110 or as supporting contracts
without any consideration," 7 the doctrine was not formulated in the
Restatement as either a kind of consideration or as an element in the
bargain type of contract. In most contracts the bargain theory still
controls. Such agreements arise from an exchange in which the con-
sideration is mutually arrived at by the parties. 18 The consideration
is usually viewed as a benefit to the promisor and a detriment to the
promisee." 9 Promissory estoppel, on the other hand, is applied in
situations where no contract in fact exists, such as gratuitous promises.
Section 90 was not intended to apply to cases of bargained-for reliance
which the Restatement clearly treats as constituting consideration.
Despite the limited role envisioned for this section, the courts have
often equated unbargained-for reliance with consideration, and in
effect have allowed such reliance to enforce contracts which lack the
114. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1969).
115. See, e.g., Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889, 903 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
116. Porter v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1932). See also Miller
v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 1152, 66 N.W. 2d 267, 272 (1954).
117. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959), quoting
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1969).
118. See Note, Protection of Aesthetic Interest, 41 IowA L. REv. 296, 298 (1956).
119. Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 688-89, 273 N.W. 315, 317 (1937);
Industrial Bank & Trust Co. v. Hesselberg, 195 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. 1946).
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elements of a traditional exchange. In this view, "justifiable and sub-
stantial reliance upon a promise, which must be enforced if injustice
is to be avoided, creates an informal contract without mutual assent
or bargained-for consideration, since the reliance is not the thing that
induces the promise."'
20
Whether a court uses Section 90 in its original form, that is, as
supporting unbargained-for promises which have been relied upon, or
whether it is used to impose liability without regard to consideration,
will be pivotal in determining the measure of damages. In the first
instance, the injured party may recover his "reliance" damages, or the
value of what he has given up in the past. In the second instance, the
injured party will be allowed recovery for the full value of the prom-
ised performance, thus substantially altering the extent of recovery.
Indications are that courts are increasingly willing to view Sec-
tion 90 in the expanded form, thus enforcing contracts in appro-
priate situations without regard to the presence or absence of con-
sideration. The applicability of this doctrine still depends, however,
on the elements most commonly associated with the section: (1) a
clear and definite oral promise; (2) reasonable reliance by the plain-
tiff on said promise; and (3) injustice which can be avoided only
through the enforcement of the promise.ul Thus, in cases where no
bargain exists in fact, Section 90 offers a theory which can be used
to protect the promisee.1
22
The theory of promissory estoppel has often been applied in the
employee area but the cases have met with only limited success.
Though the court ultimately sidestepped the issue, Hardin v. Eska 23
demonstrates the utility of the doctrine. There, plaintiff obtained an
exclusive territory in which to sell defendant's products. Without
giving any return promise, plaintiff incurred costs in advertising and
promoting the product, and in soliciting salesmen. Defendant termi-
nated the agreement without cause, and began selling in the territory
on its own. Defendant subsequently claimed that the contract was
not binding because of lack of mutuality and an absence of considera-
120. See Note, supra note 118 at 300.
121. See Jackson v. Kemp, 211 Tenn. 438, 365 S.W.2d 437 (1963); 1A A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 204, at 232 (1963).
122. Ted Spangberg Co. v. Peoples Natural Gas, 305 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D. Iowa
1969) (emphasis added). See also Shell Oil Co. v. Kelinson, 158 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa
1968).
123. 256 Iowa 371, 127 N.W.2d 595 (1964).
233
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tion, as it did not bind the plaintiff to do anything. The court found
for the plaintiff, stating the promissory estoppel notion that when
the promise contemplates that the promisee will do certain things,
and these things have been done, "justice and authority both require
that compensation be made. 1 24 The court's decision, however, relied
heavily on the fact that the plaintiff was seeking only expenses actually
incurred, and not future profits.125 This approach avoids the real ques-
tion of whether a valid contract existed. It became unnecessary to dis-
cuss whether consideration and mutuality were present, and no at-
tempt was made to determine whether promissory estoppel could
serve as a form of consideration.
Agreements which arise separately from or in addition to a con-
tract have created complex problems of determining the existence of
sufficient consideration. Byerly v. Duke Power Co.120 is one example
of how these agreements confuse and frustrate contractual expecta-
tions. The employees of defendant corporation had secured a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, but in addition to such agreement they
were given attractive fringe benefits. Defendant wished to sell the
company, and asked the employees to assist in the orderly transfer of
control. The employees, however, were faced with the possible, though
not certain, loss of the fringe benefits when the company was sold.
Defendant then promised that if the employees would aid the com-
pany in transferring the business it would continue the fringe benefits
in the event that they were terminated. In reliance thereon, plaintiffs
continued to work for the defendant. When the transfer was completed
the benefits were terminated. Defendant refused to reinstate them in
spite of employee objections, and the matter proceeded to trial. The
court acknowledged the promissory estoppel "exception" to the con-
sideration requirement in simple contracts, but felt that the facts of
this case did not fall within its terms. First, the company's promise
was not given in exchange for any act, forebearance, or promise on
behalf of plaintiffs, but was voluntary and gratuitous. 2 7 Second, the
fact that they remained with the company was immaterial since they
were fully paid for their services. Most importantly, the court found
124. Id. at 375, 127 N.W.2d at 597.
125. Id.at 373, 127 N.W.2d at 596.
126. 217 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1954).
127. Id. at 807.
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the situation lacked a manifestation of the "injustice" it deemed neces-
sary to the application of Section 90.128
One dissenting judge urged a contrary result, believing the sole
issue to be whether the defendant's promise was void for lack of con-
sideration. Plaintiffs were faced with the loss of valuable benefits if
the sale was consummated. In exchange for plaintiff's promise to assist
in the orderly transfer of the company, defendant's promise to pro-
vide the benefits in the event they were subsequently lost was suffi-
cient to bind the contract. The employees were not bound to con-
tinue their service to the company, but were they to do so the promise
would constitute sufficient consideration.12 9
Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co.,130 is a leading case defining the scope
of promissory estoppel in employment situations. The court applied
Section 90 to avoid an obvious injustice. Plaintiff had served 40 years
with defendant, but decided to retire when promised a pension. After
paying the pension for two years the defendant revoked its offer and
stopped sending the checks. The court found that, although intended
as a gift, the promise was made enforceable by plaintiff's reliance on
it. The last clause of Section 90, "if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise," brought these facts within its purview.
The above cases indicate the difficulty of using Section 90 as a
substitute for consideration. When confronted with a promissory
estoppel rationale the courts have generally fallen back upon the
bargain theory and declared such contracts void for lack of considera-
tion. Consequently, the success of a Section 90 argument is difficult to
predict. Where outrageously unjust results would flow from the un-
availability of the section, then such an argument may succeed. How-
ever, what is unjust to one court may seem nothing more than a bad
bargain to another. In no area of contractual disputes is this more
apparent than in the employment decisions.
128. Byerly v. Duke Power Co., 217 F.2d 803, 807 (4th Cir. 1951).
129. The dissent met with Professor Corbin's approval:
This treatise supports the reasoning of [the dissent]. If the continuance
in service was in fact bargained for and given in exchange for the new promise,
as might be inferred, it was a sufficient consideration satisfying the definition
in the Restatement, Contracts § 75. If not so bargained for, the continued
service was definitely alleged to have been "in reliance," and the defendant
had reason to know that the promise would lead to that result .... [Service]
was rendered by them in exchange for both the promised wages and the promised
increase, or in reliance on both promises.
IA A. COBRIN, CONTRACTS § 206, at 257 n.73 (1963).
130. 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1959).
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D. Employment at Will and the Doctrine of Unconscionability
The power to terminate employment at will, without cause, for
an abusive or capricious reason, rests on the assumption that such
power is an implied term of the employment contract. 18 ' Such a term
surely could not have the employee's willing assent, and, at least from
his point of view, is "unconscionable." An unconscionable contract
or term of a contract has been described as one "which no man in
his senses not under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and
which no fair and honest man would accept on the other." 132 Such
agreements often arise where one party takes "advantage of the neces-
sities and distress of the other."' 33
The doctrine of unconscionability, though readily identifiable
with the Uniform Commercial Code, 34 has its beginnings at least as
far back as the Roman Law' 35 Indeed, many subsequent legal systems
have developed some notion of unconscionability in attempts to les-
sen the harsh effects of contracts formed out of compulsion or dire
necessity, or in contravention of community standards of justice or
morality. Although squarely in conflict with the principle of free-
dom of contract, unconscionability has been invoked in a wide vari-
ety of settings when needed to avoid results which were, in the eyes
of a court, inequitable and unfair. Ellsworth Dobbs Inc. v. Johnson,130
demonstrates the courts' increasing willingness to invoke the doctrine
in appropriate situations:
Although courts continue to recognize that persons should not be
unnecessarily restricted in their freedom to contract, there is an in-
131. State ex rel. Lippert v. Sims, 143 W. Va. 542, 547, 103 S.E.2d 533, 537
(1958).
132. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 410 (1889).
133. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 327-28 (1942) (dis-
senting opinion).
134. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 reads:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscion-
able clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to
aid the court in making the determination.
135. See Comment, Unconscionable Contract Provisions: A History of Unen.
forceability From Roman Law to the U.C.C., 42 TUL. L. REv. 193 (1967).
136. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
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creasing willingness to invalidate unconscionable contractual provi-
sions which clearly tend to injure the public in some way.'
37
In recent years, unconscionability has been used in a number of
different contexts, supported by a variety of rationales. Although the
doctrine arose from the common law, its frequent appearance today
is a result of the Uniform Commercial Code, with its tendency to
make flexible business arrangements more enforceable as contracts. 13
While the U.C.C. was intended solely for use in the law of sales, its
principles have been found applicable in other situations such as
leases,1 9 real estate contracts, 140 bank deposit contracts, 41 loans to
corporations, 142 and franchise contracts and distributorships.1
43
Although there has been no case directly on point, the analogous
situation of franchise termination might serve to underscore the avail-
ability of the unconscionability doctrine in employment cases. As in
the employment area, lack of mutuality and indefiniteness have been
"main pillars of defense raised by franchisers against franchisees'
wrongful termination suits." 44 Under these contracts, "the power to
terminate [is] unqualified and not even good faith [is] required.'1
45
Franchise agreements are often made to reflect the dynamics of a par-
ticular business relationship, where economic factors and production
schedules require flexibility. Employment at will has endured in our
economic system for several reasons, including the fact that it allows
an employer to be flexible in the face of uncertainties in his business
and manpower requirements. Nevertheless, recent trends have indi-
cated the willingness of the courts to approach contractual situations
137. Id. at 554, 236 A.2d at 857.
138. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-204(3), which provides that even
though one or more terms are omitted or left open, a contract of sale does not fail for
indefiniteness if the parties intended to make a contract and there is a "reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."
139. Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 3 U.C.C. REP. 858
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
140. Kaye v. Coughlin, 443 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
141. David v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 59 Misc. 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S.2d 847
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
142. Whitestone Credit Corp. v. Barbary Realty Corp., 5 U.C.C. REP. 176 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1968).
143. Division of Triple T Serv. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d
191 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446,
173 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
144. Hewitt, Termination of Dealer Franchise and the Code-Mixing Classified
and Coordinated Uncertainty with Conflict, 22 Bus. LAw 1075, 1083 (1967).
145. Rubinger v. ITT, 193 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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more realistically with the goal of helping the parties realize their
contractual expectations. 140
In the franchise cases the courts approached arbitrary termina-
tion from several directions. As in employment contracts, some courts
were reluctant to go beyond the terms of the express agreement,1"
7
while others were willing to do so and found implied promises. Among
these were promises that the parties would terminate in good faith,1 48
and that franchisers would terminate only after reasonable notice. 140
In addition, courts have found arbitrary terminations to be violative
of state decisional law and have imposed liability despite express
terms of the contract to the contrary. 50 Successful franchise termina-
tion suits have also been advanced under theories of promissory
estoppel. 1'5
By bringing cases under the U.C.C., terminated franchisees have
attempted to apply the obligations of good faith, diligence, and
reasonableness to their agreements. These obligations "may not be
disclaimed, but the parties may by agreement determine the standards
by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured
if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable."'1 2 If such princi-
ples were to be applied to termination provisions in franchise agree-
ments (and, by analogy, to employment contracts), then arbitrary or
capricious termination would not be allowed.5 8 Section 2-302 of the
U.C.C. relates unconscionability to the time at which the contract was
made. For a franchisee who must invest substantial sums to secure
and initiate his business, a provision allowing termination at will
would be unconscionable. Even in this case, such a finding is far from
certain, as Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.'s' demon-
146. See Hewitt, supra note 144, at 1079. See also R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 188 (1922).
147. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Clairborne-Reno Co., 64 F.2d 224, 233
(8th Cir. 1933).
148. Milton v. Hudson Sales Corp., 152 Cal. App. 2d 418, 313 P.2d 936 (1957).
149. Mayflower Air Conditioners v. West Coast Heating Supply, 54 Wash. 211, 339
P.2d 89 (1959).
150. James W. Harrison & Sons, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 180 F. Supp. 243 (E.D.S.C.
1960).
151. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors, Inc., 253 N.C. 459, 117 SE.2d
479 (1960).
152. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(3).
153. See, e.g., Madsen v. Chrysler, 261 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. InI. 1966), vacated,
375 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1967).
154. 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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strates. The beverage company sought an injunction against the
brewer for unjustly terminating its franchise. A provision of the con-
tract allowed for termination without cause, and an argument was
made that such a term was unconscionable. The plaintiff claimed its
right to a year's notice, which it deemed reasonable, relying on Sec-
tion 2-309 (3) of the Code. That section states than an agreement
dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation would be un-
conscionable. The court found that the doctrine of unconscionability
should be directed against "one-sided, oppressive and unfairly sur-
prising contracts, but not against the consequences of uneven bargain-
ing positions or even simple old-fashioned bad bargains."'155 The court
then looked to the time when the contract was made to see whether
the termination clause was unconscionable, and said it could not be
sure from the facts whether this clause was not in fact beneficial to
the establishment of the relationship. No reasonable grounds thus
existed to hold such a clause unconscionable.
Such analysis, however, negates the very purpose of the uncon-
scionability doctrine. A franchisee would assent to do business on
such terms only because of the unequal bargaining power which
exists between the parties. He had to have the contract on those
terms or not have the contract at all. The reasoning of the Sinkoff
court is maddeningly obtuse; the unconscionable term cannot be un-
conscionable because without it no contract would have been formed
at all.
Similarly, in the employment situation, the employer might not
have hired his employee if he had not had the power to terminate
for even abusive reasons, and in that sense such term was beneficial to
the formation of the contract. In the employment-at-will situation,
however, one might distinguish between the employment "contract"
and the employment "relationship." The employment relationship
may be viewed as a succession of contracts, which, during a lengthy
term of service, is modified or reformed by promotions, raises, in-
creased proficiency, or even by words of encouragement and praise by
the employer. The "contract" which sustains the employment today
is vastly different from one into which parties entered in the past.
Such being the case, the earlier contracts which impliedly allowed
155. Id. at 448, 273 N.Y.S.2d 366.
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the employer to terminate for an abusive reason would surely be tin-
conscionable today.
The Code does not define unconscionability, thus allowing the
courts wide discretion in fashioning remedies appropriate to the facts
of a particular case. There appears to be no compelling reason to
deny employment contracts the protection of the unconscionability
doctrine. It would certainly be anomalous to deny these agreements
protections that are afforded contracts of vastly less social significance.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of employment at will serves the economically use-
ful function of allowing an employer to tailor his work force to the
exigencies of any business situation, and to remove from his employ
any unproductive or incompatible employee. However, the rule that
where no duration is mentioned in an employment contract, an em-
ployer may discharge his employee for any reason at all-no matter
how unfair-is undesirable. 5 The social and economic insecurity
which such a rule fosters is not justified by arguments which proclaim
"freedom of enterprise" or "freedom of contract." To make an em-
ployee's livelihood depend on technical measurement of mutuality of
obligation, or lack of consideration, is to ignore modern social reali-
ties in favor of antique legal constructs.
The inability of the traditional law of contracts to respond to
essentially contractual problems has been frequently stated.157
While "contracts" is a body of generalized rules that is supposed
to serve any and all types of transactions, when any problem be-
comes socially significant it tends to be removed from the domain of
generalized contract law and becomes the particularized law of say,
"sales," "insurance," or "labor law."' 58
And yet, general contract law governs employment at will. One result
of this is that an employee may be dismissed at any time without re-
dress. An attempt might be made to dismiss the argument simply by
156. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 110; Summers, Collective Agreements and
Law of Contracts, 78 YAu. L.J. 525 (1969).
157. Macaulay, supra note 110, at 486.
158. Id.
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stating that the employee should have provided for a term of em-
ployment when he was hired. However, such a rationale does not
recognize the great disparity of bargaining power that exists in the
normal employment situation. The employee generally has to accept
a contract terminable at will, or not be selected for the job. Funda-
mental fairness demands protection for him; this can only enhance
individual dignity and economic security.
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